This paper develops a reputation strategic model of monetary policy with a continuous nite or in¯nite time horizon. By using the optimal stopping theory and introducing the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational equilibria, we give the conditions under which the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies not only for stochastic but also for nonstochastic settings even with a¯nite horizon. We provide the conditions for the existence of stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium, and also completely characterize the existence of stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium.
Introduction
Time inconsistency is an interesting problem in macroeconomics in general, and monetary policy in particular. Although technologies, preferences, and information are the same at di®erent time, the policymaker's optimal policy chosen at time t 1 di®ers from the optimal policy for t 1 chosen at t 0 < t 1 . The study of time inconsistency is important. It not only provides positive theories that help us to understand the incentives faced by policymakers and provide the natural starting point for attempts to explain the actual behavior of policymakers and actual policy outcomes, but also require one to design policy-making institutions. Such a normative task can help one understand how institutional structures a®ect policy outcomes.
This problem was¯rst noted by Kydland and Prescott (1977) . Several solutions have been proposed to deal with this problem since then. Barro and Gordon (1983) were the¯rst to build a game model to analyze \reputation" of monetary policy. 1 The second solution is based on the incentive contracting approach to monetary policy. Persson and Tabellini (1993) , Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997) developed models using this approach. The third solution is built on the legislative approach. The major academic contribution in this area was by Rogo® (1985) .
Among these approaches, the \reputation" problem is key. If reputation consideration discourages the monetary authorities from attempting surprise in°ation, then legal or contracting constraints on monetary authorities are unnecessary and may be harmful.
The main questions on reputation are when and how the government chooses in°ation optimally to minimize welfare loss, and, whether the punishment can induce the government to choose zero in°ation. The conclusions of Barro-Gorden models are: First, there exists a zeroin°ation Nash equilibrium if the punishment for the government deviating from zero-in°ation is large enough. However, this equilibrium is not sequentially rational over a¯nite time horizon.
The only sequentially rational equilibrium is achieved if the government chooses discretionary in°ation and the public expects it. Only over an in¯nite time horizon can one get a low-in°ation equilibrium. Otherwise, the government would be sure in the last period to produce the discretionary outcome whatever the public's expectation were and, working backward, would be expected to do the same in the¯rst period. Second, there are multiple Nash equilibria and there 1 Backus and Dri±ll (1983) extended the work of Barro and Gordon to a situation in which the public is uncertain about the preferences of the government. Persson and Tabellini (1990) gave an excellent summarization of these models. Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1994) discussed reputation equilibrium in the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game.
is no mechanism to choose between them.
Finite time horizon games are more reasonable than in¯nite ones in the real world. We can say that every government's lifetime is¯nite. Many experimental studies of games suggest that there are cooperation equilibrium when the players are told that the game will end. Consequently, how to induce cooperative behavior in a¯nitely repeated game is an interesting problem even for game theorists.
In this paper, we use the optimal stopping theory in the stochastic di®erential equations literature to study the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy with the continuous¯nite or in¯nite time horizon model. The optimal stopping theory can cover many dynamic economic applications under uncertainty. The optimal stopping theory, though relatively complete in its theoretical development, has not yet been widely applied in economics. By using the optimal stopping theory and introducing the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational equilibria, we give the conditions under which the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies within our setting not only for stochastic but also for nonstochastic settings even with a¯nite horizon. We provide the conditions for the existence of stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium, and further completely characterize the existence of stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium. We show that the government will keep the in°ation at zero if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
As a result, the government will keep in°ation at zero if the rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation is small (a < 2) or the government puts more weight on stabilizing output than on stabilizing in°ation. It will act opportunistically if the rate of aggregate output gain from the unanticipated in°ation is high or the government puts less weight on stabilizing output than on stabilizing in°ation, and then be expected to behave (and will behave) accordingly in every succeeding period. Thus, the objective rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation and the subjective preferential policy on the relative importance between stabilizing output and stabilizing in°ation can be used together to determine whether or not the government keeps in°ation at zero.
The results obtained in the paper are sharply contrasted to the negative results from the certainty setting with a discrete time horizon. Our results on the existence of the stationary zero in°ation policy as an equilibrium solution are also true for the nonstochastic continuous¯nite horizon settings, which demonstrate the advantage of our continuous time model compared to the nonstochastic discrete time¯nite horizon model discussed in the literature. As we mentioned above, in the certainty setting with discrete time, a reputational equilibrium is possible only if the horizon is in¯nite. Thus, a striking advantage of using a continuous-time formulation is that it yields a solution to the time inconsistency problem whereas a discrete-time counterpart does not. Why does the much more complicated continuous-time formulation yield a positive result that the discrete-time formulation could not? Intuitively speaking, it is because, in continuous time, the government has an option to change a policy any intermediate periods while, in the discrete-time formulation, the government can change a policy only in each stopped subinterval, and thus the solution to the continuous-time formulations can be viewed as the sum of the solutions to the discrete-time formulations for many small stopped subintervals. Thus, the embedded option in continuous-time formulation may appear to explain why the continuoustime formulation can yield a solution to the time inconsistence while the discrete-time versions in the existing literature fails.
2
We also investigate the robustness of the equilibrium behavior by showing that the imposed assumption is reasonable. As long as the inequality a(1 ¡ µ) < 2 holds, we can expect a stationary zero-in°ation outcome by the sequentially strong rational behavior so that the rational expectation reputation can discourage the monetary authority from attempting surprise. When a(1 ¡ µ)¸2, whether or not we can expect the monetary policy to have a tendency to become stable depends not only on the lifetime of the government, but also on the beliefs of the government and the public, ceteris paribus. If the time horizon is long enough, we may expect the monetary policy tends to stable beyond some point of time. Although the initial economy shocks may not implement a stationary sequentially rational equilibrium at the beginning, under the sequentially strong rational strategy behavior assumption, the reputation trigger equilibrium have a tendency to reach a new stationary equilibrium beyond some point in time. If the life time of the government is not long enough to reach such a point, we may be able to use an incentive contract or a legislative approach to reach it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will set up the model and provides a solution for the optimal stopping problem faced by the government. In Section 3, we 2 Such an advantage of the continuous-time formulations can be also found in other¯elds such as the principalagent literature. For instance, Holmstrom and Milgrom's (1987) continuous-time Brownian model not only generate the second-best solution, but their solution is remarkably simple. SchÄ attler and Sung (1997) provided the above explanation for the principal-agent models. study the equilibrium behavior. The robustness of this monetary game is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 gives the conclusion.
Model

The Setup
We consider a continuous time game theoretical model with two players: the government and the public. The government's strategy space is R + £ L[0; T], from which the government is to choose an action (¿; f¼ t g t2T ). Here ¿ is the time that the government changes its monetary policy from the zero-in°ation rule to a discretion rule; ¼ t is the in°ation rate chosen by the government at time t; T is the lifetime of the government which can be¯nite or in¯nite; and L[0; T ] is the class of Lebesgue integral functions de¯ned on [0; T]. The public's strategy space is L[0; T ], from which the public is to choose an action (f¼ e t g t2T ).
Here ¼ e t is the expected in°ation rate formed by the public at time t.
Suppose that, at the beginning, the government commits an in°ation rate ¼ 0 = 0, and the public believes it so that ¼ e 0 = ¼ 0 = 0. The government has the right to switch from the zeroin°ation to a discretion rule ¼ t 6 = 0 at the time t between 0 and T. However, after he changes his policy, he loses his reputation.
The government's payo® function is described by a quadratic discounted expected loss function of the form:
where ½ is the discount factor with 0 < ½ < 1, y t is aggregate output, ¹ y t is the economy's natural rate of output, and µ is a positive constant that represents the relative weight the government puts on output expansions relative to in°ation stabilization. Here, the target in°ation ¼ is zero. 3
(1) is a typical marco welfare function that has played an important role in the literature, and means that the government desires to stabilize both output around ¹ y t + k, which exceeds the economy's equilibrium output of ¹ y t by a constant k, and in°ation around zero.
The government's objective is to minimize this discounted expected loss function subject to the constraint imposed by a Lucas-type aggregate supply function, the so-called Phillips curve, 3 Without loss of generality, the target in°ation rate is assumed to be zero. The results obtained in the paper will continue to be true if the monetary authority has a target in°ation that di®ers from zero.
which describes the relationship between output and in°ation in each period:
where a is a positive constant that represents the e®ect of a money surprise on output, i.e., the rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation so that the larger is a, the greater is the central bank's incentive to in°ate, and X t is the shock at time t that is assumed to be an Ito di®usion process:
which is a special case of the general Ito di®usion:
with b(X t ) = 0 and ¾(X t ) = ¾. Here, B t is 1-dimensional Brownian Motion and ¾ is the di®usion coe±cient with ¾ < 1.
The public has complete information about the policymaker's objectives. It is assumed that the public forms his expectations rationally, and thus the assumption of rational expectation implicitly de¯nes the loss function for the public as
2 . The public's objective is to minimize this expected in°ation error. Given the public's understanding of the government's decision problem, its choice of ¼ e is optimal.
We¯rst examine the \one-shot" game. The single-period loss function`t for the government is:`t
The equilibrium concept in this game is noncooperative Nash. Then the government minimizes t by taking ¼ e t as given, and thus we have the best response function for the policymaker:
The public is assumed to understand the incentive facing the government so they use (4) in forming their expectations about in°ation so that
Solving (5) for ¼ e t , we get the unique Nash equilibrium
long as EX t 6 = k, the policymaker has incentives to use the discretion rule although the loss at
Note that, if X t = k a.s. for t¸0, the unique Nash equilibrium of the \one-shot" game for the public and the government, is ¼ e¤ t = ¼ ¤ t = 0 a.s., and thus, the time-inconsistency problem will not appear. To make the problem non-trivial, without loss of generality, we assume that X t 6 = k a.s. for t¸0 in the rest of the paper.
A potential solution to the above time inconsistency problem is to force the government to bear some consequence penalties if it deviates from its announced policy of low in°ation. One of such penalties that may take is a loss of reputation, and so, in this paper, we will adopt the reputation approach that incorporates notions of reputation into a repeated-game framework to avoid this time consistency problem. If the government deviates from the low-in°ation solution, credibility is lost and the public expects high in°ation in the future. That is, the public expects zero-in°ation as long as government has ful¯lled the in°ation expectation in the past. However, if actual in°ation exceeds what was expected, the public anticipates that the policymaker will apply discretion in the future. So the public forms their expectation according to the trigger strategy: Observing \good" behavior induces the expectation of continued good behavior and a single observation of \bad" behavior triggers a revision of expectations.
The Optimal Stopping Problem for Government
In order to solve the time inconsistency problem by using the reputation approach, we¯rst incorporate the government's loss minimization problem into a general optimal stopping time problem. During any time in [0; T ], the policymaker has the right to reveal his type (discretion or zero-in°ation). Since he has the right but not the obligation to reveal his type, we can think it is an option for the policymaker. So the policymaker's decision problem is to choose a best time ¿ 2 [0; T ] to exercise this option.
The policymaker considers the following time-inhomogeneous optimal stopping problem:
where
is the instantaneous loss function for the policymaker when he uses the zero-in°ation rate which is clearly Lipschits continuous, and
is the expected loss function for policymaker in which he begin to use the discretion rule at time s. Note that g(¢)¸0 since the loss function`t¸0. We assume that g(¢) is a bounded function,
i.e., g(¢) · M for some constant number M.
We assume that the public uses stationary strategy:
putting (4) into (8), we have
We now calculate the conditional expectation for X 2 t and X t . Let A be the characteristic operator
Then, by Dynkin formula (Âksendal 1998, p. 118) , we have
Substituting (10) and (11) into (9), we have
Note that, if we de¯ne
then the loss minimization problem in (6) can be reduced to the following maximization problem:
In the following, we will use the optimal stopping approach to solve the optimization problem (13).
Solve the Optimal Stopping Problem
In order to solve the government's optimization problem (13) by using a standard framework of the optimal stopping problem involving an integral (cf. Âksendal (1998, p. 213 )), we make the following transformations: Let So Z t is an Ito di®usion starting at z := Z 0 = (s; x; w). Let R z = R (s;x;w) denote the probability law of fZ t g and let E z = E (s;x;w) denote the expectation with respect to R z . In terms of Z t the problem (13) can be written
which is a special case of the problem
Then, for
the characteristic operator A Z of Z t is given by
Let U = f(s; x; w) : G(s; x; w) < G ¤ (s; x; w)g and V = f(s; x; w) : AG(x) > 0g:
Then, by (14) we have
Remark 1 Âksendal (1998, p. 205) shows that: V ½ U, which means that it is never optimal to stop the process before it exits from V . For each x 6 = k, if we choose a suitable ¼ e (x) such
Therefore, any stopping time less T will not be optimal for all (s; x; w) 2 V , and thus ¿ ¤ = T is the optimal stopping time. We will use this fact to study the time inconsistency problem of the monetary policy game in the following sections.
Remark 2 In fact, we can verify directly that
is de¯ned by
Thus, ¿ ¤ = T is the optimal stopping time.
The Equilibrium Behavior of the Monetary Policy Game
In order to study the equilibrium behavior of the monetary policy game, we¯rst give the following lemma that shows that the government will keep the zero-in°ation policy when the public uses trigger strategies and reputation penalties imposed by the public are large enough.
Lemma 1 Let ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼ s 6 = 0g. Then, for all x with x 6 = k, any trigger strategy of the public, f¼ e t (x)g, which has the form of
discourages the policymaker from attempting surprise in°ation.
Proof: For each x 2 R with x 6 = k, if we choose any ¼ e 2 fh : (x¡k¡ah) 2 > (1+a 2 µ)(x¡k) 2 g, we have
and thus any stopping time less T is not optimal for the government. Hence, ¿ ¤ = T . Thus, when the public applies this trigger strategy, it is never optimal for government to stop the zero-in°ation policy. Q.E.D
Although there are (in¯nitely) many trigger strategies given in Lemma 1 that can discourage the policymaker from attempting surprise in°ation, most of them are not optimal for the public in terms of minimizing the public's expected in°ation error:
To rule out the those nonoptimal strategies, we have to impose some assumptions how the public form an expectation and what an equilibrium solution should be used to describe the public's self-interested behavior.
Di®erent assumptions on the public's behavior may result in di®erent the optimal solutions. In the following, we introduce two types of sequentially rational equilibrium solution concepts.
Let fF t g be a¯ltration, i.e., a nondecreasing family fF t : t¸0g of sub-¾-¯elds of F: F s ½ F t ½ F for 0 · s < t < 1, which is assumed to be generated by the process itself, i.e., F t := ¾(X s : 0 · s · t). Then, F t can be regarded the set of accumulated information up to time t.
Suppose the government knows the distribution of the shock, X t , exactly, that is,
where e P G is the belief of the government for the movement of the shock, P is the measure of the shock.
We suppose that the public does not know the distribution of the shock, but it's belief e P P is absolutely continuous with respect to P 4 , which means that if an event does not occur in probability, then the public will believe that this event will not happen. and M(t) is a martingale. This means that, whenever new information becomes available, the belief of the public is adjusted. We can interpreter M(t) is the information structure of the society, it is a measurement of how the public knows the real shock.
We suppose that M(t) is P -square-integrable and X t is e P P -integrable. We also suppose that hX t ; M(t)i = 0 5 , heuristically, this assumption can be interpreted as: the history of the shock can't help the public to predict the movement of the future shock. 6
We denote by e E the expectation operator with respect to e P P .
A strategy (¿; f¼ t ; ¼ e t g) is said to be a sequentially strong rational equilibrium strategy for the dynamic model de¯ned above if
(1) the belief of the public for the movement of the shocks X t , e P P , satis¯es Bayes'
rule:
4 e P P (A) = 0 for each A 2 Ft, such that P(A) = 0. 5 hX; Y i is cross-variation, which is de¯ned by hXt; Yti = lim jj¦jj!0 P 1·k·m
where X t and Y t are square-integrable, and ¦ = [t 0 ; t 1 ; :::; t m ] is a partition of [0,t] . 6 Note that, if one assumes that the public knows the distributions of the shocks, Xt, exactly, then M(t) = 1. This is a usual assumption made in the literature.
for all s < t;
(2) The expectation of the public is strong rational:
(3) it optimizes the objectives of the public and the government.
A strategy (¿; f¼ t ; ¼ e t g) is said to be a sequentially weak rational equilibrium strategy for the dynamic model de¯ned above if
(2) The expectation of the public is weak rational:
The di®erence between sequentially strong rational equilibrium and sequentially weak rational equilibrium is that the sequentially weak rational equilibrium uses the information only at time 0 to form the public's belief and expectation on the government's policy while the sequentially strong rational equilibrium uses accumulated information up to the present to form the public's belief and expectation on the government's policy. Thus, the sequentially weak rational equilibrium, in general, is a weaker equilibrium solution concept to describe the public's behavior. This implies that every sequentially strong rational equilibrium is clearly a sequentially weak rational equilibrium, but the reverse may not be true. However, when the shocks, fX t g, are nonstochastic, these two equilibrium solutions are equivalent. Now we use these two types of sequentially rational equilibria to study the time consistency problem in monetary policy. Propositions 1 and 2 below show the existence of such equilibria.
Proposition 1 Suppose the shocks fX t g satisfy the inequality:
2 for all t 2 [0; T ] and x 2 R with x 6 = k:
Let (¿; f¼ s g) be the strategy of the government, where ¿ is the¯rst time that the government changes its policy from zero-in°ation to discretion rule, i.e., ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼ s 6 = 0g. Let the strategy of the public f(¼ e t )g be given by
Then, (¿ ¤ ; f¼ ¤ t ; ¼ e¤ t g) with ¿ ¤ = T , ¼ ¤ t = 0 and ¼ e¤ t = 0 for all t¸0 is a sequentially strong rational equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public. Bayes' rule, (2) the strong rational expectation condition holds:
) optimizes the objectives of the public and the government.
We¯rst claim that the public updates its belief by Bayes' Rule. Indeed, since M(t) is a martingale and, for s < t, X t is a e P P -integrable random variable, then, by Lemma of Shreve & Kruzhilin (1999, p. 438) , the Bayes' Rule holds:
To show
,¯rst note that X t and M(t) are square-integrable martingale, using the fact that X t M(t) ¡ hX t ; M(t)i is a martingale (Karatzas & Shreve(1991, p. 31) ) and the assumption \X t ; M(t)i = 0, We can get that X t M(t) is a martingale, by Bayes' Rule:
which means fX t g is also a martingale under e P P . Since the policymaker's best response function is given by
fX t g is a martingale under e P P , and ¼ e t = aµ(k ¡X ¿ ) is complete information at time t, we have
Substituting
2 g for all x 2 R with x 6 = k. Then, by Lemma 1, and the optimal stopping time is ¿ ¤ = T. Therefore, we must have
Since the public only cares about his in°ation prediction errors, so ¼ e t = µ(k ¡ X t ) minimizes the public's expected loss when the policy change occurs at time t in this game. Hence, if both the policymaker and public believe that future shocks will grow enough to make the inequality (19) hold, the threat of the public is creditable. Hence, we must have ¼ e¤ t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T] since ¿ ¤ = T. Thus, we have shown that the trigger strategies (¿; f¼ t ; ¼ e t g) result in a sequentially strong rational equilibrium, which is ¿ ¤ = T, ¼ ¤ t = 0, and ¼ e¤ t = 0 for all t¸0. Q.E.D. Thus, Proposition 1 implies that, as long as all disturbance shocks X t are bigger enough, the public can use a trigger strategy to induce a stationary zero-in°ation sequentially strong rational equilibrium. Of course, the assumption that
for all t 2 [0; T] and x 2 R with x 6 = k seems very strong. Proposition 3 in the next section shows that this is a reasonable assumption. As long as this inequality holds for the initial shock x, the public and the government will have a strong belief that it will be true for all t 2 (0; T] and x 2 R.
The sequentially strong rational equilibrium has imposed a strong assumption on the public's self-interested behavior. If the public's self-interested behavior is described by the sequentially weak rational equilibrium, we can have the following proposition which completely characterizes the existence of the stationary zero in°ation strategy as an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 Let (¿; f¼ s g) be the strategy of the government, where ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼ s 6 = 0g.
Let the strategy of the public f(¼ e t )g be given by
Then, the stationary zero-in°ation policy, i.e., ¿ ¤ , ¼ ¤ t = 0 and ¼ e¤ t = 0 for all t¸0, is a sequentially weak rational equilibrium strategy for the policymaker and the public if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
Proof: We¯rst note that (1 + aµ) 2 > 1 + a 2 µ if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Substituting
for all x 2 R n fkg if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Then, we have
and thus the optimal stopping time is given by
Hence, ¿ ¤ = T , ¼ ¤ t = 0 and ¼ r¤ t = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ] if and only if a(1¡ µ) < 2. The proofs of the other parts are the same as those in Proposition 1. Therefore, the trigger strategies (¿; f¼ t ; ¼ e t g) result in a stationary zero-in°ation sequentially weak rational equilibrium, which is given by ¿ ¤ ,
Thus, as long as a(1 ¡ µ) < 2, the public can use a trigger strategy to induce a stationary zero-in°ation equilibrium outcome that is sequentially weak rational. Figure 1 shows the range of the parameters a and µ, which guarantees the existence of a stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium. Note that, if the government's relative weight parameter µ¸1, i.e., if the government thinks that stabilizing output is at least as important as stabilizing in°ation, or if the economic environment parameter a · 2 so that the rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation is not too high, this inequality always holds and stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium can be guaranteed. When the inequality a(1¡µ)¸2, the sequentially weak rational trigger equilibrium, which is given by
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
As such, the government will act opportunistically if the rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation is high (a > 2) or the government puts less weight on stabilizing output than on stabilizing in°ation (µ < 1), and then be expected to behave (and will behave) that way in every succeeding periods. It will keep the in°ation at zero if the rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation is small or the government puts more weight on stabilizing output than on stabilizing in°ation. Thus, the objective rate of the output gain from the unanticipated in°ation, combining together with and the subjective preferential policy on the relative importance between stabilizing output and stabilizing in°ation, can determine whether or not the government keeps in°ation at zero. In the literature, some papers assume that the economic environment parameter a is normalized to one. However, from our results, the choice of a will a®ect whether or not a monetary policy is time consistency, and thus it cannot be arbitrally normalized to be one.
When shocks X t becomes nonstochastic, i.e., X t = X 0 = x, the sequentially strong rational equilibrium and sequentially weak rational equilibrium are the same. Thus, from Propositions 1 and 2, we have the following corollary that shows that the existence of a stationary zero in°ation equilibrium is completely characterized by the inequality a(1 ¡ µ) < 2.
Corollary 1 Let (¿; f¼ s g) be the strategy of the government, where ¿ = inffs > 0 : ¼ s 6 = 0g.
Then, the stationary zero-in°ation policy, i.e., ¿ ¤ , ¼ This possibility result on the existence of the stationary zero in°ation policy as an equilibrium shows the advantage of our nonstochastic continuous¯nite horizon setting compared to the nonstochastic discrete time¯nite horizon settings discussed in the literature. It is well known that, in the certainty setting with discrete time, a reputational equilibrium is possible only if the horizon is in¯nite. Otherwise, the government would be sure in the last period to produce the discretionary outcome whatever the public's expectation were and, working backward, would be expected to do the same in the¯rst period. Thus, our results are sharply contrasted to the negative results from the certainty setting with discrete time horizon.
Robustness of Equilibrium Solutions
In this section we study the robustness of sequentially strong rational equilibrium. In order to get the sequentially strong rational equilibrium in Proposition 1, we imposed the assumption
2 g for all 0 · t · T and x 2 R with x 6 = k. It might appear that the result in Proposition 1 is sensitive to this assumption. Is this assumption reasonable? The following proposition shows that the result is quite robust in the sense that, as long as the initial starting point x is in B, the expected¯rst exit time from B will be in¯nite.
for t¸0g, and let = infft > 0 : X t = 2 Bg be the¯rst time X t exits from B. Suppose that x 2 B, i.e., a(1¡µ) < 2.
Then, we have
for all x 2 R with x 6 = k.
Since X 0 = x 2 B for all x 2 R, there are two cases to be considered: (1) x > C and (2) x < D.
Case 1. x > C. Let´c = infft > 0: X t · Cg, and let´n be the¯rst exit time from the interval fX t : C · X t · ng for all integers n with n > C. We¯rst show that P x (X´n = C) = n¡x n¡C and P x (X´n = n) = x¡C n¡C . Consider function h 2 C 2 0 (R) de¯ned by h(x) = x for C · x · n (C 2 0 (R) means the functions in C 2 (R) with compact support in R). By Dynkin's formula,
we have
Thus,
and thus
Hence, we have
Letting n ! 1, we conclude that P x (X´n = n) = x¡C n¡C ! 0 and´c = lim´n < 1 a.s. Therefore, we have
Case 2. X 0 = x < D. De¯ne´D = infft > 0; X t¸D g. Let´n be the¯rst exit time from the interval
for all integers n with ¡n < D. By the same method, we can prove that
Letting n ! 1, we conclude that P x (X´n = n) = D¡x n+D ! 0 and´D = lim´n < 1 a.s., and thus
Thus, in either case, we have
Proposition 3 thus implies that, because the expected exit time from B is in¯nite since the expectation E x [´] = 1 for all x 2 R with x 6 = k, the policymaker will have the belief that the future shocks will stay in B forever, and consequently they will likely make decisions and behave according to this belief. As a result, the sequentially strong rational equilibrium will likely appear in the game when the public has the same belief as the government. So, in this sense, we can regard the class B as an absorbing class for X t as long as x 2 B. Note that, for
x 6 = k, x 2 B if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. 7 Therefore, (1 +aµ) 2 (x¡ k) 2 > (1+ a 2 µ)(x¡ k) 2 if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Thus, as long as a(1 ¡ µ) < 2, the sequentially strong rational equilibrium solution is stable.
7 Indeed, a(1 ¡ µ) < 2 is equivalent to (1 + aµ)
What happens if the initial shock x is not in B (i.e., if 2¸a(1 ¡ µ))? We have following proposition:
Proposition 4 De¯ne ¿ = infft > 0 : Z t 2 Bg. Then for x = 2 B, i.e., a(1 ¡ µ)¸2, we have
Now consider h 2 C 2 0 (R) such that h(x) = x 2 for D · x · C. By Dynkin's formula:
by noting that a(1 ¡ µ)¸2. Q.E.D.
Notice that, from (30), one can see that, the bigger shock (measured by ¾), the faster the convergence rate. In particular, if
This means that, when the shocks fX t g degenerate to a non-stochastic process and the public has the same belief as the government, the government and the public will believe that X t 6 2 B for all t 2 [0; T ], and thus a stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium does not exist. This is actually the result we have already obtained in Corollary 1. On the other hand, if
This means that, when the shocks fX t g become very large and the public has the same belief as the government, the public and the government may believe that X t will be in B for t 2 (0; T].
As such, the policymaker and the public will likely have the beliefs that the shocks X t will be in B right after the initial shock x, and consequently, the stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium will likely appear in the time horizon (0; T ].
When 0 < ¾ < 1, from Proposition 4, the expected time of entering B,
is a¯nite number. Suppose the public has the same belief as the government. There are two cases to be considered: (1) E x [¿]¸T . In this case, the government and the public likely believe that X t 6 2 B for all t 2 [0; T ], and thus a stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium will unlikely exist. (2 . In other words, one will have an instationary policy period if the initial shock x 6 2 B, however, after a certain point ¿, the monetary policy may become stationary. Thus, the time inconsistency can happen at most once.
Summarizing the above discussion, we can draw the following conclusions:
(i) When a(1 ¡ µ) < 2, any initial shock x with x 6 = k is in the class B, one can expect all future shocks X t are in B and thus can expect a stationary zero-in°ation outcome by the sequentially strong rational behavior.
(ii) When a(1 ¡ µ)¸2, any initial shock x with x 6 = k is not in the class Thus, for this continuous time dynamic stochastic game, the sequentially strong rational equilibrium behavior can be well predicted for any initial shock.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the equilibrium behavior of the time inconsistency problem in a continuous time stochastic world. We introduce the notions of sequentially weak and strong rational equilibria, and show that the time inconsistency problem may be solved with trigger reputation strategies not only for stochastic but also for nonstochastic settings even with¯nite horizon. We provide the conditions for the existence of stationary sequentially strong rational equilibrium, and also completely characterize the existence of stationary sequentially weak rational equilibrium. We show that, when x 6 = k, the government will keep the in°ation at zero if and only if a(1 ¡ µ) < 2. Thus, the reputation can discourage the monetary authority from attempting surprise in°ation as long as this inequality holds. Furthermore, we investigate the robustness of the sequentially strong rational equilibrium behavior solution by showing that the imposed assumption is reasonable and the sequentially rational equilibrium is very stable.
